

Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS) AN/SLY-2(V)

The AN/SLY-2(V) Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS) was to be the Navy's next generation shipboard electronic warfare system planned for use with the Aegis Combat System and Ship Self Defense System Mark 2. It was a total replacement for the AN/SLQ-32(V) system. Increment 1 of AIEWS included the capability to detect and identify radio frequency emissions, provide precision angle of arrival information to cue hard-kill fire control system sensors, and launch self-protection decoy devices such as NULKA. Integration of Increment 1 with the ship command and decision system was to support other sensor cueing and combat identification. Increment 2 would have included additional capability.

The Navy approved the Operational Requirements Document in April 1997. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan was received by OSD in March 1998, and was returned without approval because of a fundamental disconnect between the program structure, as agreed to by the Program Executive Officer in November 1997, and the program structure reflected in the language of the Milestone II Acquisition Decision Memorandum. The program was rebaselined in FY01 as a result of cost and schedule breaches. On April 15, 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) announced that the AIEWS program was cancelled, citing continued program instability, cost growth, and development delays. Proceeding with the program was assessed as a high-risk venture with minimum potential for successful completion within acceptable costs and schedule.

TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY

There was no Test & Evaluation activity during FY02.

TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

There are no test results on which a performance assessment can be based. A significant issue with the AIEWS Test & Evaluation program was the lack of realistic threat representative anti-ship cruise missile targets, specifically, a platform with appropriate radar cross section that could carry anti-ship cruise missile active radar seekers or acceptable seeker simulators at threat-representative speeds and altitudes. The legacy Test & Evaluation platform, identified up-front by the Operational Test & Evaluation community as not meeting the requirement, is a large, slow P-3 aircraft that cannot descend to appropriate threat-representative altitudes. The use of an existing target drone, integrated with an anti-ship cruise missile active radar seeker, appeared to be an acceptable solution, but adequate numbers of these drones were never funded for Operational Test & Evaluation of AIEWS. However, these targets will have to be funded for operational evaluation of the LPD 17 soft-kill capability (provided by NULKA, an electronic decoy).



Shown is a demonstration antenna used during at-sea engineering tests.

